Conditional Commitment Mechanisms in Climate Negotiations: An Experimental Investigation
报告题目(Title)：Conditional Commitment Mechanisms in Climate Negotiations: An Experimental Investigation
报告人(Speaker)：李智 助理教授(厦门大学)
地点(Place)：后主楼1124
时间(Time)：2021-6-23, 上午 10:00-11:00.
邀请人(Inviter)：张博宇
报告摘要
The goal of the Paris Agreement is to hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C or 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. However, only 2.7°C could be achieved if all countries meet their current intended nationally determined contributions (INDC). We introduce a conditional commitment mechanism (CCM) in a two-stage pledge process to improve the cooperation of the climate negotiations, motivated by the refund mechanism in the traditional threshold public goods games. Under the two-stage CCM, the first stage of pledges captures voluntary contributions of self-interests, and the second stage is framed as a threshold public good game with money back guarantee, in which no actual contributions would be made unless the remaining endogenous threshold (gap) is reached given the first-stage voluntary pledges. Through laboratory experiments, we show that two-stage CCM improves climate cooperation in both homogeneous and heterogeneous induced value environments, leading to more emission reductions and a higher provision rate. This occurs because CCM reduces the concern of high-cost sunk contributions and thus narrows the gap.
主讲人简介
李智，厦门大学经济学院财政系和王亚南经济研究院助理教授，美国华盛顿大学（西雅图）经济学博士。主要研究领域为资源和环境经济学，公共经济学，博弈论和实验经济学。在Journal of Public Economics等期刊发表学术论文，目前主持国家自然科学基金面上项目一项，着重研究应对气候变化合作的激励机制与行为特征。
