Link complementarity and social coordination
数学专题报告
报告题目(Title)：Link complementarity and social coordination
报告人(Speaker)：崔志伟（中国人民大学）
地点(Place)：教八108
时间(Time)：2025年12月29日（周一）13:30-14:30
邀请人(Inviter)：张博宇
报告摘要
We consider a model of social coordination and network formation where agents decide on an action in a coordination game and on whom to form costly links to. We explore the role of link complementarity; that is, active and passive connections are strategic complements. With link complementarity, agents have to deal with both the issue of link coordination and the issue of action coordination. We find that Nash equilibria are characterized by reciprocal sub-networks where an agent forms links with agents who form a link with her. Further, risk-dominant or payoff-dominant strategy profiles are stochastically stable. More interestingly, the resulting networks are strongly reciprocal: for almost every agent, the set of agents to whom she forms a link coincides with the set of agents who form a link with her. The notion of strong reciprocity refines the set of reciprocal networks, and offers a prediction for interaction structures.
主讲人简介
崔志伟，中国人民大学经济学院教授、博士研究生指导教师，兼任中国运筹学会博弈论分会常务理事。主持在研/完成国家自然科学基金项目4项，以第一作者或通讯作者在Journal of Economic Theory、Games and Economic Behavior（2篇，含独著1篇）、Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization、Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control、Journal of Mathematical Economics、《运筹与管理》、《管理评论》等国内外知名经济学或管理学期刊发表论文20余篇。获中国信息经济学会2023创新成果奖、中国人民大学2022年度优秀科研成果奖一等奖、中国信息经济学会学术年会（2019）最佳论文、浙江省高等学校科研成果奖二等奖等奖励和荣誉。
