Network-Based Peer Monitoring Design
科研大讨论系列报告
报告题目(Title)：Network-Based Peer Monitoring Design
报告人(Speaker)：宋阳波(香港中文大学深圳)
地点(Place)：后主楼1124
时间(Time)：2024年3月8日 14:00—15:00
邀请人(Inviter)：张博宇
报告摘要
We study a team incentive design problem where multiple agents are located on a network and work on a joint project. The principal seeks the least costly mechanism to incentivize full efforts, by choosing the work assignment sequence and the rewards to the agents upon success. Whereas the agents' actions are hidden to the principal, they may be observed among the agents given the internal information that is determined by the network and the sequence. Under effort complementarity, the transparency of the agents' actions can reduce their incentive costs but with decreasing marginal effectiveness. For several typical network topologies, we derive explicit properties of an optimal assignment sequence, and propose a number of measures to rank networks in terms of total cost and stability.
